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The U.S. House of Representatives was often a focal point for sectional and partisan struggle in
the years preceding the Civil War.  One manifestation of this struggle was the difficulty that the
House persistently experienced in organizing itself for business.  Half of the twelve Congresses
that convened from 1839 to 1861 witnessed protracted balloting for the speakership.  Twice, in
the 31st and 34th Congresses, balloting persisted for weeks; divisions seemed so insurmountable
that proposals were seriously considered to adjourn these Congresses and await new elections.
Battles over the speakership were the most visible of the sectional and partisan contests
for control of the House in the antebellum era, but there were others.  In previous research we
have shown that the House printership was a highly prized position because of its patronage
potential and centrality to the network of partisan newspapers that were so critical to the success
of the Jacksonian Democratic party (Jenkins and Stewart 2003).  Indeed, the move to viva voce
voting in elections for House officers did not occur because of Speakership stalemates, but rather
because of wrangling over the choice of Printer.
This paper investigates further the difficulties inherent in House organization during this
period, by focusing on another elected officer, the House Clerk.  Balloting for the Clerk extended
beyond an initial round on eight different occasions prior to the Civil War, with a high of 20
ballots in the 31st Congress (1849-51).  Yet, not much is known about the Clerk’s role in House
organization and politics more generally in antebellum America.  Aside from two short sections
2in Alexander (1916, pp. 12-25, 91-94), the House Clerk has garnered little systematic, scholarly
attention.
In the antebellum era, the House Clerkship was a significant political post that was
coveted because of its patronage potential and central role in organizing the House at the start of
its biennial sessions.  As head of a bureaucratic operation, the Clerk controlled a number of
resources.  This included formal positions within the Clerk’s office, which could be handed out
to loyal party members, but also control over the House’s contingent fund, which was used for
the institution’s day-to-day expenses.  This latter resource put the Clerk in a position to deal with
a number of merchants, developers, and laborers who vied for a myriad of House contracts. 
Moreover, the Clerk was provided with a good deal of hiring discretion, which allowed him to
pass along lucrative patronage to loyal partisans.  
Beyond being a partisan patron, the Clerk was also the de facto chamber leader at the
opening of a Congress, prior to the election of a new Speaker.  His chief duty was to call the roll
of members-elect, which gave him discretion in deciding whose credentials entitled them to vote
in the initial organization of the House.  In a partisan era, such latitude could have major
consequences.  On one occasion, the 26th Congress (1839-41), it determined which party
controlled the House.
Thus, a systematic study of the House Clerk from the Nation’s origins through
Reconstruction provides an additional view of the importance of Congressional institutions,
separate from but complementary to the speakership and printership, in building and maintaining
party organizations.  In this sense, then, our perspective is broader than the study of a single
31 In 1819, the House established a new House officer, the Printer, to print and distribute the
Journal.  
chamber of Congress, as we contend that the emergence and development of House institutions
played a vital role in American political development more generally.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  First, we examine the formal development of
the office of House Clerk.  We then explore the intersection of the Clerk’s position with the
partisan politics of the antebellum and Civil War/Reconstruction House of Representatives by
discussing in detail the experiences of four House Clerks:  John Beckley (1789–1797,
1801–1807), Hugh A. Garland (1838–1841), Emerson Etheridge (1861–1863), and Edward
McPherson (1863–1875).  Next we take a step back and discuss patterns in the voting for House
Clerk over time, focusing particularly on patterns of partisan unity and division.  In the final
section we offer some concluding remarks concerning the relationship between the formal
organization of the House of Representatives and the development of the American party system.
The Office of the House Clerk
The first House Clerk, John Beckley, was elected immediately after the election of the first
House Speaker on April 1, 1789 (HJ, 1-1, 4/1/1789, p. 6).  The Clerk’s formal role for the first
several Congresses was purely administrative.  He was responsible for initiating the call of the
House; reading bills and motions; attesting and affixing the seal of the House to all writs,
warrants, and subpoenas issued by order of the House; certifying the passage of all bills and joint
resolutions; and printing and distributing the Journal to the President and all state legislatures
(HJ, 3-2, pp. 227-31).1  Additional administrative tasks, such as noting all questions of order
42 The number of employees in the Clerk’s Office was reported sporadically until a joint
resolution was passed in March 1823, which required the Clerk to provide an accounting on an
annual basis.   
3 Many of these part-time workers were pages.  Their steady increase did not go unnoticed by
House leaders.  On March 31, 1838, the Committee on Accounts submitted a report investigating
the duties of various Officers of the House.  The committee resolved that the Clerk should
employ no more than twelve pages, and that this number should be reduced whenever possible
(House Report 750 [25-2] 335).  The House took up the report on April 4, 1838, and the
resolution was amended, with the power of page appointment taken from the Clerk and given to
the Doorkeeper (Congressional Globe, 25-2, 4/3/1838, p. 281).
4 In modern terms, this is between $1.1 million and $14.2 million, depending on which deflator is
used.  See Economic History Services, “What Is the Relative Value in U.S. Dollars?” url: 
(and subsequent decisions) and providing House members with copies of the Journal, soon
followed (HJ, 12-1, p. 530; 22-1, p. 899).
A casual observer might take note of these administrative duties and believe the House
Clerk to be little more than a secretary, or as John S. Millson (D-Va.) once remarked, simply a
“mouthpiece” (Congressional Globe, 36-1, 12/8/1859, p. 66).  Yet this characterization would be
incomplete.  First, the Clerk controlled a number of resources.  The Clerk was allowed to employ
a staff in order to carry out his litany of administrative duties.  Initially, such appropriations were
modest.  In the 2nd Congress, the Clerk was provided with funds for three assistant clerks (ASP,
2-2, p. 59).  By the 14th Congress, the House Clerk supervised five assistant clerks, in addition
to a messenger and a librarian (ASP, 14-2, p. 311).  This broadening of the Clerk’s sphere of
influence continued steadily over time.  The left-portion of Table 1 tracks the size of the Clerk’s
office from 1823-1870.2  The number of full-time positions grew slowly, with an explosion of
part-time positions through 1835.3  Beginning in the late-1850s, appropriations for full-time
positions expanded, and by the mid-to-late 1860s, the Clerk supervised approximately 50 full-
time employees at combined annual wages in excess of $80,000.4
5http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare, accessed 14 August 2004.
5 Certain stipulations did affect the congressional printing, however, with various efforts to
secure low-cost bids and establish per-page cost ceilings (Smith 1977).  However, few other
expenses were monitored closely.  One exception was the purchase of stationary, which was
typically a significant expense on a per-Congress basis.  This exception had a political origin.  In
1842, during the 27th Congress, the House investigated the contracts of Hugh Garland, the
House Clerk in the 25th and 26th Congresses.  The Committee on Public Expenditures reported
that Garland purchased stationary at inflated prices, in effect paying nearly 40% more than in
previous years, when lower-cost bidders had also vied for the House contract (House Report 880
[27-2] 410).  Several reasons for this overpricing were suggested, all of which involved fraud.  In
particular, patronage-based partisanship and indirect embezzlement, via kickbacks, were strongly
intimated.  Garland vociferously denied the fraud charge, as well as any other wrongdoing, in a
lengthy memorial complete with detailed itemizations (House Document 275 [27-2] 405).  Keep
in mind that Garland had also been at the heart of the highly partisan battle over organizing the
26th House (see below), which infuriated the Whig Party.  And the Whigs controlled the House
and the Committee on Public Expenditures in the 27th Congress, so partisan payback could have
been the motivation for the investigation (and the potential trumped-up fraud charge). 
Nevertheless, the implications of the investigation led the House to require the Clerk to begin
soliciting and reporting bids for stationary contracts (Statutes at Large, 27-2, pp. 526-27).
6 The Clerk’s control of the contingent fund was unquestioned prior to March 1, 1823, when
Congress passed a joint resolution that required the House Clerk and Senate Secretary to publish
an annual statement detailing the expenses from the contingent fund of their respective chambers
(Statutes at Large, 17-2, p. 789). Yet, the guidelines for reporting the expenses were broad, and
Clerks typically responded with summary totals, rather than individual itemizations.  On August
26, 1842, this changed, as the Whig-controlled Congress adopted a new resolution requiring the
House Clerk and Senate Secretary to provide more precise statements of their contingent-fund
The Clerk also controlled the House’s contingent fund, which was used for the day-to-
day operations of the chamber and the general upkeep of the facilities and grounds.  Expenses
ranged from the purchase of newspapers, Journals, stationary, and writing materials for member
use; to the purchase of fuel, furniture, horses, Capitol police, and maps for continuing chamber
operations; to the hiring of carpenters, painters, bricklayers, blacksmiths, chimney sweeps, and
general laborers, as well as the purchase of materials, for general physical-plant upkeep.  As a
result, the Clerk was responsible for entering into any number of contractual agreements, with
few programmatic guidelines5 and little institutional monitoring.6  Moreover, the annual sums
6expenses (Statutes at Large, 27-2, p. 527).  Specifically, the resolution required the Clerk to
provide “the names of every person to whom any portion [of the contingent fund] has been paid;
and if for any thing furnished, the quantity and price; and if for any services rendered, the nature
of such service, and the time employed, and the particular occasion or cause, in brief, that
rendered such service necessary; and the amount of all appropriations in each case on hand,
either in the Treasury or in the hands of any disbursing officer or agent.”  The Whigs’ adoption
of this more stringent accounting system may have been partially related to the investigation of
Hugh Garland, the former House Clerk (see footnote 5), but it was also part of a more general
pattern of retrenchment in response to the prolonged economic depression of the early 1840s.  
7 To provide a substantive baseline, the $593,658 at the Clerk’s disposal in 1856 would be akin
to nearly $11.2 million in 2003 dollars.
underlying these contracts became substantial over time.  As the right-most column of Table 1
indicates, beginning in the early-1830s, the Clerk controlled a contingent-fund purse routinely in
excess of $100,000.  In some years, the Clerk would have nearly $600,000 under his control.7 
This led to the following newspaper characterization: “It is easy to see that the man who has
such a fund at his disposal must be a personage of influence” (National Era, 11/20/1856, p. 186).
Thus, the partisan implications of controlling the Clerk’s Office were significant.  The
Clerk was in a position to dole out patronage, both directly, via positions of employment in the
Clerk’s Office, and indirectly, via supply and labor contracts with outside agents.
In addition to the resources that came with the office, the House Clerk also played a role
in the internal organization of the chamber as a whole.  First, the Clerk of the previous Congress
served as the interim presiding officer of each new Congress.  After the Speaker was elected, a
new Clerk would be elected (or the old one re-elected).  This decision that the Clerk “carry over”
was made in the First Congress (HJ, 1-3, 3/1/1791, p. 396), and hearkened back to an ordinance
adopted in 1785 in the Continental Congress (Alexander 1916, p. 12).  As interim presiding
officer, the Clerk called the roll of members-elect, thereby formally determining the House
78 HJ, 1-1, 4/17/1789 p. 16.
9 On two separate occasions during this period, on February 19, 1838 and January 28, 1839, John
Quincy Adams proposed resolutions that would have required members-elect to submit election-
certification credentials with the House Clerk (Congressional Globe, 25-2, 2/19/1838, p. 190;
25-3, 1/28/1839, p. 143).  In both cases, Adams’s resolution was postponed and never
subsequently acted upon.
membership for organizational purposes.  For the first few decades of the Republic, the Clerk
prepared the roll in consultation with the Committee on Elections, which possessed the authority
to validate members’ credentials.8  By the 1830s, however, the Committee on Elections
neglected its credential-validating duty, leaving the Clerk to construct the roll completely on his
own (Hinds’ Precedents, chap. 2, § 18).9
Thus, the autonomy in making the House roll that evolved over time afforded the Clerk a
good deal of institutional power.  In effect, he became the sole arbiter of the House membership,
as the lack of strict certification rules provided him with a good deal of discretion in making out
the roll.  Alexander (1916, p. 93), writing in the early twentieth century, noted the potential
repercussions:
This opens the door to great temptation, for ... [the Clerk] may omit from the list
the name of any member, the regularity of whose election he questions.  In other
words, he can, if so disposed, refuse to recognize a sufficient number of
credentials because of technical errors or spurious contests to give his party a
majority of those privileged to participate in the election of a Speaker.
Such partisanship would become an issue at the opening of the 26th Congress, when the
House Clerk, Hugh Garland, passed over five Whig members-elect from New Jersey in his call
of the roll, because their seats were being contested by five Democrats.  This decision gave
numerical control to the Democrats.  We examine this case in greater detail in the next section.
810 See Congressional Globe, 37-1, 7/4/1861, pp. 7-9; 7/5/1861, pp. 13-16.
11 The law stated that the Clerk, in making his roll, “would place thereon the names of all persons
and such persons only, whose credentials show that they were regularly elected in accordance
with their states respectively, or the laws of the United States.”
In 1861, a series of cases established that the House could correct the Clerk’s roll of the
members-elect by either adding or striking a member.10  However, this was merely a second-
order alteration, in that it did not restrict the Clerk’s ability to influence the initial partisan
makeup of the chamber.  That is, the House could only correct the Clerk’s roll after the
membership of the chamber was first determined by the Clerk.  Thus, the Clerk still maintained
the ability to tilt majority control of the chamber when partisan distributions were close.
On March 3, 1863, the last day of the 37th Congress, the Clerk’s ability to certify the
election credentials for members-elect, which had simply been a norm since the 1830s, was
codified (Statutes at Large, 37-3, p. 804).  This action was spurred by Republican leaders’
realization that Republican midterm losses could jeopardize the party’s control of the House. 
The codification tailored the law in such a way to direct the Clerk to recognize the election
certificates of “loyal” members-elect from former-Confederate states, but bar those who would
oppose the Republican agenda.11  Used strategically, the 1861 law would bias the roll in favor of
the Republicans.  In reality, the House Clerk, Emerson Etheridge, planned to use the 1861 law
against the Republicans, but failed in his attempt.  This case also will be covered in detail in the
next section.
On February 21, 1867, the 1863 law was revised to include a provision directing the
Clerk to place on his roll only those members-elect from states represented in the preceding
Congress (Statutes at Large, 39-2, p. 397).  By this time, the Radicals were firmly in control of
9the Republican Party and were waging a war with President Andrew Johnson over the course of
Reconstruction policy.  The passage of the 1867 law effectively secured a “Radical
Reconstruction” of the South, by eliminating the possibility that the Clerk could recognize pro-
Johnson governments prior to Congressional organization.  
The passage of the 1867 law proved to be the last major alteration of the Clerk’s
institutional position in the nineteenth century.  To this day, the House Clerk has the authority to
determine the membership roll, based on state election certificates (Deschler’s Precedents, ch. 2,
§ 8).
Clerks as Partisans
Most Clerks of the House who served in the 19th century left a light trace as individuals on
American history.  Four Clerks were exceptions—John Beckley, Hugh Garland, Emerson
Etheridge, and Edward McPherson.  Beckley used his position as House Clerk to become a
partisan electoral manager; Garland, Etheridge, and McPherson used their control over the roll of
members-elect to influence (or attempt to influence) the partisan makeup of the chamber.
John Beckley, Jeffersonian Party Manager
John Beckley was the first House Clerk and is the most well known today, being the subject of
several scholarly articles and books (Marsh 1948; Martin 1949-50; Cunningham 1956; Jahoda
1960; Berkeley and Berkeley 1962, 1973; Gawalt 1995; Pasley 1996).  Beckley’s political career
began in Virginia state politics, as he worked his way up through the ranks, serving as a clerk in
several settings, most notably the State Senate and the House of Delegates.  His various positions
put him in contact with the state’s political notables, and he secured recommendations from
10
Edmund Randolph and James Madison in his quest to become the first Clerk of the U.S. House
of Representatives.  His aim was realized on April 1, 1789 when Beckley was elected on the
second ballot, the first ballot ending in a tie (HJ, 1-1, 4/1/1789, p. 6; Berkeley and Berkeley
1975, p. 85).
Beckley soon became energized by the political debates in the House.  He was drawn to
the positions espoused by the Democratic-Republicans and blanched at those offered by the
incumbent Federalists.  Thomas Jefferson became his political idol, while Alexander Hamilton
emerged as his bitter foe.
Beckley was not content simply being an observer of the House’s political drama.  He
soon realized that being Clerk provided distinct opportunities to support the Jeffersonian cause. 
As Cunningham (1956, p. 42) notes:  
As Clerk of the House, Beckley was in a position to watch every move in
Congress with much more facility than most of the members.  His eyes fell on
papers few others chanced to see; his ears picked up bits of conversation meant
never to be heard outside a confidential circle.
Taking advantage of his privileged position, Beckley would pass on sensitive information
on a range of topics directly to Jefferson, as well as indirectly to Jefferson’s lieutenants, Madison
and James Monroe.  This information was often used strategically, to give Jefferson and his party
an advantage in the framing of public opinion as well as in congressional debates and roll-call
votes (Martin 1949-50).  Moreover, Beckley performed behind the scenes as a proto-whip,
“using his position to organize the [Jeffersonian] congressmen and, through them, the party
membership” (Jahoda 1960, p. 254).
Despite his efforts on behalf of Jefferson, Beckley was able to keep his partisan leanings
under wraps.  As a result, he was reelected Clerk in the three succeeding Congresses (HJ 2-1,
11
10/24/1791, p. 434; 12/2/1793, 3-1, p. 4; 12/7/1795, 4-1, p. 365).  During this time, he remained
highly partisan and expanded his sphere of influence.  Most notably, he began to pen editorials in
the partisan press, many in the noted anti-Federalist newspaper, the Aurora, under pseudonyms
like “Americanus” and “A Calm Observer.”  In this capacity, he leaked confidential information
regarding Jeffersonian targets (like Hamilton and Washington) while maintaining his position as
Clerk and, thus, his proximity to a range of politically useful memos and documents.
Beckley finally tipped his political hand during the winter of 1795-96, during debate on
the Jay Treaty.  A devoted Francophile, Beckley opposed diplomatic treaties generally, but
especially with the hated British.  He used his influence and all of the information at his disposal
to organize the Jeffersonians in the House against the treaty, but fell short in the end.  The Jay
Treaty passed 51-48 (HJ, 4-1, 4/30/1796, p. 531).
Now out in the open, Beckley focused his efforts on getting Jefferson elected president in
1796.  In this capacity, he would become known as one of the Nation’s first party managers. 
Beckley targeted his adopted home state of Pennsylvania, and began a massive electoral
campaign, which included the production and distribution of thousands of handwritten ballots
and political handbills throughout the state (Martin 1949-50; Cunningham 1956).  Beckley won
the battle, chalking up 14 of Pennsylvania’s 15 electoral votes for Jefferson, but lost the war, as
Adams secured an Electoral College majority.
Beckley would soon thereafter receive his comeuppance.  The Federalists had regained
majority control of the House in the 5th Congress, and they moved to oust Beckley from the
chamber.  On May 15, 1797, the opening day of the Congress, they were successful, taking
advantage of the absence of several Jeffersonians to elect James Condy Clerk over Beckley by a
12
12 For a recent fictional account of Callender, Beckley, and the often unsavory battles waged in
the early partisan press, see Safire (2000).
13 Beckley’s partisanship did not end with the clerkship.  As Jahoda (1960, p. 257) notes, “Even
as a librarian Beckley was political.  His conception of duty on the job was simple; he tried to
keep Federalists from seeing documents which would give them useful information.”
single vote, 41-40 (Annals, 5-1, p. 51).  Moreover, the Federalists and their newspaper allies
began a smear campaign against Beckley, charging that he knowingly miscounted votes in his
capacity as Clerk on a critical roll call involving the Jay Treaty (Berkeley and Berkeley 1973, p.
156).  
Buffeted by these setbacks, Beckley spiraled down over the next several years,
maintaining a meager existence by authoring occasional newspaper editorials.  He remained an
active tormentor of prominent Federalists, for instance being the one who persuaded James
Thomas Callender to publish the infamous charges of adultery against Alexander Hamilton
(Berkeley and Berkeley 1975, p. 89).12  Finally, in 1800, Jefferson was elected president and his
supporters controlled Congress.  Beckley’s loyalty was rewarded through his return to the House
clerkship, to which he was subsequently elected in the 7th, 8th, and 9th Congresses.  In 1802,
Beckley was also selected as the first Librarian of Congress, a position he held (along with the
clerkship) until his death in 1807.13
Hugh Garland, Democratic Operative
Hugh Garland was perhaps the most infamous House Clerk, as his institutional decisionmaking
altered the partisan control of the chamber.  Garland’s initial election in the 25th Congress
(1838) was notable, being the first in which the viva voce procedure was used in balloting for
House officers (Jenkins and Stewart 2003).  Garland, who had served five years in the Virginia
13
14 The Albany Argus (12/6/1838, p. 2) put it this way:
[Garland’s] election is a triumph to the friends of the administration, and a sore
mortification to its opponents, who had confidently counted upon a different result. . . . 
The conservatives, who have not resolved to become part and parcel of the federal party,
supported Mr. Garland with cordiality.
On the first ballot Garland received  25 of 26 votes cast by Deep South Democrats, but only 19
of the 79 votes from other regions.  Northern support mostly was split between Edward
Livingston (N.Y.) and Henry Buehler (Penn.).  This pattern persisted into the second ballot.  In
the third, Garland collected all but 7 of the 104 votes cast by Democrats.  Six of those votes were
cast for Matthew St. Clair Clarke, the Whig candidate, all by Democrats whose NOMINATE
scores suggest they were closer ideologically to the Whigs.
15 A reporter for the New Yorker, who was in Washington covering the House organization,
documented the effect of the viva voce procedure in this way: “Whigs, Administration men, and
Conservatives, prepare to show your colors: there will be no dodging allowed” (12/8/1838, p.
190).
House of Delegates as a staunch Jacksonian, emerged as the victor on the third ballot, after an
internal rift over the sub-treasury plan had divided the Democrats and threatened the party’s
control of the chamber (Albany Argus, 12/6/1838, p. 2).  Garland had been the Administration
candidate;14 the viva voce procedure exposed individual members’ votes for Clerk and forced
dissident conservatives to toe the party line or risk penalties.15
Garland was elected Clerk in the “lame duck session” of the 25th Congress, after the
elections for the 26th Congress had mostly been held.  Those elections were held in the midst of
an economic depression, resulting in significant gains in the polls for the Whigs.  Consequently,
most political observers assumed that Garland was as much a lame duck as the House he was
chosen to serve.  The anti-administration Hartford Courant consoled itself with the election of
Garland by opining that “the House has a Loco Foco Clerk for three months and no more.  In the
next Congress parties change fionts [sic] in point of strength” (12/7/1838, p. 3).
14
Yet once the dust had settled from the 1838 midterm election, it was unclear whether
Whig gains were sufficient for them to gain control of the House.  An election dispute over five
of New Jersey’s six at-large House seats, known as the “Broad Seal War,” contributed to this
uncertainty.  (One of the at-large New Jersey seats was not in dispute.)  Who would organize the
House?  Rowell (1901, p. 110) summarized the situation as thus:  “The House at the time was so
closely divided politically that if either set of [New Jersey] claimants was admitted it would give
the majority to the party to which they belonged; if neither set was admitted the Democrats
would have a majority.”
Garland’s roll of the members-elect would therefore be crucial to the House’s
organization. The New Jersey elections had been at-large affairs, and the outcomes hinged on
allegations of illegal voting in two towns and the subsequent elimination of the ballots in
question (see Rowell 1901, p. 109-10).  The process had clear partisan overtones.  The New
Jersey governor was a Whig who supported the towns’s decisions and certified the election of
the five Whigs.  The Secretary of State was a Democrat who opposed the towns’s decisions and
certified the election of the five Democrats.
Determining the rightful set of New Jersey members would be difficult.  Yet, the Clerk’s
role was not to determine who rightfully deserved the seats, but rather to decide who should be
seated to establish the House’s initial membership.  Under the rules and precedents, only after
the House was formally organized could the New Jersey contest be settled once and for all.  In
such circumstances, Garland’s decision should have been straightforward.  As Dempsey (1956,
p. 65) states:
Five of the claimants (Whigs) carried certificates of election signed by the
Governor who was the legal authority empowered to issue such certificates.  They
15
16 Rumors that Garland might attempt such a maneuver abounded well in advance of the vote. 
On November 23, a story in the New Yorker reported “Some [rumors] indicate ... that the Clerk
of the last House, (who is ex officio of this until a new election,) will take the responsibility of
reading from a newspaper a list of the claimants from New Jersey, instead of the returned
Members.  We trust that better Councils will prevail...” (p. 153).
17 John Quincy Adams kept a clear log of the politicking in his diary.  To Adams, Garland’s
parliamentary maneuver was obvious: “This movement has been evidently prepared to exclude
the five members from New Jersey from voting for Speaker; and the Clerk had his lesson
prepared for him” (Adams 1876, p. 143).
were unquestionably in valid form.  Under the existing rules of the House, the
Clerk had no alternative other than to accept the certificates, since they were
prima facie evidence of the right to the seats.  On the basis of all precedents, the
persons certified by the Governor should have been seated, and contests brought
later.
Yet Garland took another course.  On December 2, 1839, the 26th House convened, and
Garland began his call of the roll of members-elect.  When he reached New Jersey, he
announced that conflicting evidence existed regarding the election of five members and
suggested that he would therefore skip their names and finish calling the roll, thereby allowing
the House to deliberate and sort out the specifics of the New Jersey case afterward
(Congressional Globe, 26-1, 12/2/1839, p. 1).16
The House erupted.  Over the next several days, debate would be prolonged and
contentious.  The Whigs wanted Garland to read the names of the five Whig members, and
demanded to know the law of New Jersey for election certification.  The Democrats supported
the Clerk, and urged him to reveal his legislative precedents for passing over the five New Jersey
seats.17  In addition, various resolutions were put forth so that the House could organize itself,
some excluding the New Jersey members and some including them, but none carried
(Congressional Globe, 26-1, 12/2/1839, pp. 1-11).  On December 5, John Quincy Adams was
16
18 Hawes’s absence was especially frustrating, as he was in Washington and a call had gone out
requesting his presence (Congressional Globe, 26-1, p. 48).  But he was apparently too sick to
attend the vote (Adams 1876, p. 161).
made “Chairman” of the House, until the organization could be settled.  After two additional
days, and some unrecorded teller votes, Adams noted in his diary that “it is apparent ... that the
choice of the Speaker will depend entirely upon the New Jersey vote” (Adams 1876, p. 150).
After several additional days of debate, the House turned to the question of whether the
reading of the roll should continue and include the names of the five Whigs from New Jersey,
who were holding the certificate of election signed by the Governor.  This was rejected by a 115-
118 vote (Congressional Globe, 26-1, 12/11/1839, p. 40).  R. Barnwell Rhett (D-S.C.) then
moved that the Clerk complete the remainder of the roll, which would include all members-elect
whose seats were not contested.  This carried in the affirmative without division (Congressional
Globe, 26-1, 12/11/1839 p. 41).  Garland subsequently completed his call of the roll (sans the
New Jersey members) the following day.
The Whigs had lost the Battle of New Jersey, but they did not surrender. On December
13, 1839, Henry Wise (W-Va.) moved to amend the roll via a resolution stating that the election
credentials of the five New Jersey Whigs were sufficient to entitle them to their seats.  The
previous question was called and seconded, but lost on a tie (117–117) roll call vote
(Congressional Globe, 26-1, 12/13/1839, p. 48).  Thus, Wise’s resolution did not carry.  The
Whigs had believed they possessed enough votes to carry the day, but were mistaken.  They
were undone by three missing would-be votes, resulting from the death of James C. Alvord (W-
Mass.), the absence of Thomas Kempshall (W-N.Y.), and the illness of Richard Hawes (W-
Ky.).18  This led Adams to claim: “There was therefore a vote of eight majority of the whole
17
19 Adams’ math included the three would-be votes, along with the votes of the five excluded
New Jersey members.
20 In early January 1840, the New Jersey election dispute was referred to the Committee on
Elections.  After testimony was taken and evidence examined, the committee returned a
recommendation that the five Democrats be seated, which, on July 17, 1840, the House adopted
by a vote of 101-22.  This represented just a quorum, as many Whig members, unhappy with the
recommendation, refused to vote.  For more details, see Rowell (1901, pp. 109-13).
House affirming the right of the New Jersey members to their seats, which they lost by this tie”
(Adams 1876, p. 161).19
Albert Smith (D-Me.) then rose and moved that the House proceed to the election of a
Speaker.  After several other motions and points of order were made, Smith’s motion passed
118-110.  The Speakership election commenced the following day, December 14, 1839.  After
two days and eleven ballots, Robert M. T. Hunter (W-Va.) was elected.  Whigs nationally
rejoiced at the election of one of their own as Speaker, only a week after the bitter defeat over
New Jersey.  However, Hunter was in fact viewed internally as a compromise candidate,
acceptable to a pivotal bloc of Democrats because of his states’ rights proclivities (Stewart
1999). As we shall see, this turned out to be the highpoint of Whig politics during the 26th
Congress.
Hunter, in his capacity as Speaker, refused to swear in the five New Jersey members, but
rather referred the question to the judgment of the House.  George Evans (W-Me.) subsequently
moved that the Speaker administer the oath to the five Whig members from New Jersey, which
was defeated by 112-116 vote (Congressional Globe, 26-1, 12/20/1839, p. 69).  A resolution to
resolve the New Jersey situation was then postponed while the House continued to organize
itself.20
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Table 2 breaks down three key votes on the admission of the five New Jersey members
by party.  As the results indicate, rather than being a matter of any sort of procedural principle,
the vote distributions reveal a distinct (and near unanimous) partisan hue.  Very few partisan
defections are revealed, as the question of admission went hand-in-hand with the issue of House
organization.  In the end, the result favored the Democrats.
[Table 2 about here]
Democrats continued to roll the putative Whig House leadership on the next order of
business, which was the election of the Clerk.  In order to get to balloting for Clerk, the House
had to revisit one last time the rules change that mandated viva voce voting in the first place.  A
motion to return to secret balloting was defeated along the same partisan lines as in the
past—Democrats supported viva voce voting and Whig supported secret ballots (Jenkins and
Stewart 2003).  As we shall see, Democratic adherence to the strategy of forcing votes for House
officers out in the open again paid off.
Garland was once again the Democratic nominee for Clerk; he emerged victorious on the
first ballot, receiving 118 votes, of 231 cast total (HJ, 26-1, 12/21/1839, p. 99).  All of Garland’s
votes came from Democratic members who had failed only a week before to prevail in electing a
Speaker.  Garland’s principal opponent was Matthew St. Clair Clarke, who had previously
served six terms as Clerk in Democratic Houses.  This time all of Clarke’s support came from
Whigs—more pertinently, all of Clarke’s support came from the same set of members who had
previously prevailed in electing Hunter Speaker.  
Thus, the House lived under the peculiar circumstance of having one coalition electing a
Whig Speaker one week and then the opposite coalition electing a Democratic Clerk the next. 
19
21 The following tables describe the relationship between voting for Clerk, Printer, and Speaker:
Vote for Clerk:
Vote for Printer: Garland Clarke Mason No vote Total
Blair & Rives 107 2 0 1 110
Gales & Seaton 0 85 4 3 92
Scattering 0 3 2 0 5
No Vote 11 15 2 — 28
Total 118 105 8 4 235
Vote for Speaker:
Vote for Printer: Hunter Jones Keim Scattering No vote Total
Blair & Rives 8 48 22 2 30 110
Gales & Seaton 89 0 0 3 0 92
Scattering 3 0 0 2 0 5
No Vote 19 7 2 0 — 28
Total 119 55 24 7 30 235
As it turns out, this was not the only case of the coalition that elected Hunter Speaker losing
control of the House floor in the 26th Congress.  After electing a Speaker and Clerk, the House
then spent a month debating the choice of a Printer.  The final choice, Blair and Rives, was the
Administration printer, and thus another victory of the “minority” Democrats.21  This pattern
continued more generally throughout the 26th Congress.  Stewart (2000) identified the 26th
Congress as one of several in the antebellum period in which the coalition electing the Speaker
ended up losing more roll call votes than it won.
20
22 Some southern Whigs had threatened to bolt and support their own candidate for Speaker.  In
the end, they largely stayed loyal on the speakership ballot, rebelling instead on the clerkship
vote.
The Whigs performed well in the 1840 elections and as a result finally gained
unchallenged majority control of the House.  Thus, one would have expected Garland finally to
meet his comeuppance.  Garland was in fact deposed but, in the process, the majority Whigs
often resembled the Gang that Couldn’t Shoot Straight.
On the weekend before the 27th Congress convened, John White (Va.) was selected by
the Whig caucus as its nominee for Speaker (Richmond Enquirer, 5/14/1841, p. 3; Albany Argus
6/2/1841, p. 2; New York Evening Post 5/31/1841, p. 2).  White’s primary virtue was his undying
devotion of Henry Clay, who pushed (through the Kentucky and New England delegations) for
White’s election.  To balance White, Clay and his supporters decided on Frances Ormand
Jonathan (“Fog”) Smith of Maine as the nominee for Clerk.  Smith had previously served in the
House as a conservative Democrat.  In Clay’s mind, a ticket of White and Smith would cement
the coalition he was trying to build of Whigs and conservative northern Democrats.
In fact, this gambit alienated a significant portion of the Whig caucus, breaking up the
meeting “in high dudgeon” (Albany Argus, 6/2/1841, p. 2, reprinting a New York Evening Post
story; New York Commercial Advertiser, 6/2/1841, p. 2).  Matthew St. Clair Clarke, himself an
ex-Jacksonian who had fallen out with Jacksonian orthodoxy, offered himself as a candidate
instead who was able to appeal to both Whigs and conservatives, and was eventually victorious
(New York Commercial Advertiser, 6/2/1841, p. 2).
Once the House convened, the Whigs got their choice of Speaker on the first ballot.22 
Then balloting for Clerk began.  On the first ballot the Whigs split between their two candidates,
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Smith (89 votes) and Clarke (38), while Democrats rallied once last time behind Garland.  (See
Table 3 for partisan breakdowns of all ballots in the 27th Congress.)  On the second ballot
Democrats broke ranks, redistributing some votes to Clarke and Richard C. Mason.  The third
ballot saw an even greater defection of Democrats to Clarke, but now ten Whigs also defected in
favor of Clarke.  The fourth and final ballot saw further consolidation of Clarke’s position, as he
won with a coalition that was 50-50 Democrat and Whig.
[Table 3 about here]
In the words of the Whig New York Commercial Advertiser, “The locos [Democrats]
wished to help the southern Whigs to kill off a conservative and, at the same time, to foment
jealousies in the Whig ranks” (6/2/1841, p. 2).  This they did.
The House proceeded to examine Garland’s behavior while Clerk, via the Committee on
Public Expenditures, and claimed that he had been involved in fraudulent activities (see footnote
5).  Garland denied committing fraud, and countered each of the committee’s charges in detail
(House Document 275 [27-2] 405).  Moreover, he endeavored to explain his reasons for not
calling the names of the five Whig members from New Jersey, citing various British
Parliamentary procedures from the seventeenth century (House Document 106 [28-1] 442).
Despite Garland’s efforts to explain his actions and clear his name, it was to no avail. 
His reputation was tarnished, and he faded into political obscurity.         
Emerson Etheridge, Conservative Schemer
Prior to serving as House Clerk, Emerson Etheridge had a meandering partisan career. 
He began by representing Tennessee as a member of the Whig Party in the 33rd House.  After
the Whig Party disintegrated, he won election to the 34th House as a member of the American
22
23 For election results, see Dubin (1998, p. 167, 173, 179, 185).
24 Although there was no formal caucus nomination of candidates, Speaker and Clerk candidates
ran as a team (Albany Atlas and Argus, 7/4/1861, p. 1; New York Times, 7/6/1861, p. 4).  As the
Times correspondent commented:
It is understood that Mr. Blair’s friends and those of Mr. Forney will pull together
for the offices of Speaker and Clerk of the House, while those of Messrs. Grow
and Etheredge [sic] will cooperate.  It is thus apparent that there is still a North
and a South, and that parties are as studious as ever to avoid sectionalism in their
combinations.  As of old, a Northern man and a Southern man put their shoulders
together under Republican rule, and that after half the South has seceded.  No fact
could more clearly disprove the oft-repeated charge of “sectionalism” brought
against the Republicans. (NYT 7/4/1861, p. 1)
Party.  He then narrowly lost reelection to the 35th House running under the American label. 
Regrouping as the American Party’s fortunes fizzled, he ran as a member of the Opposition Party
and won election to the 36th House.23  While a member of the 36th House, he pushed for
sectional compromise, but maintained unconditional support for the Union.  In keeping with his
Whiggish background, he supported former-Whig and fellow Tennessean John Bell, the
Constitutional Union candidate, for President in 1860.
Despite his partisan wanderings, Etheridge drew the attention of Republican leaders.  In
consolidating their organization in the 37th Congress, after the southern secession, Republicans
sought to reach out to the border states as a means of keeping them loyal to the Union.  Etheridge
was an attractive candidate, a firm backer of the Union from a southern border state and a
protegé of Andrew Johnson.  As a result, after being mentioned initially for various cabinet
positions, he was tabbed as the administration candidate for House Clerk.  And, on July 5, 1861,
he was elected on the first ballot, easily defeating the incumbent Clerk, John Forney
(Congressional Globe, 37-1, 7/5/1861, p. 10).24
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The New York Times also noted Etheridge’s election was “warmly approved by the
representations from the Border States.” (NYT, 7/6/1861, p. 1).  To appease the Blair and Forney
factions of the party, each candidate was provided with a position in the Republican hierarchy:
Blair was made Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, while Forney was appointed
Secretary of the Senate.
Etheridge was a loyal administration supporter for the first year and a half of the war,
until its theme changed from preservation of the Union to emancipation.  Etheridge, like many
other Tennessee loyalists, opposed freedom and social equality for slaves, and thus felt betrayed
by the Republican Party (Maness 1989, p. 102).  As a result, a realigning of allegiances began. 
As Belz (1970, p. 555) states: “The Emancipation Proclamation portended revolution and
impelled many border Unionists to cooperate with Democrats in the conservative opposition.”
Etheridge hatched a plan to overturn Republican control of the House by tilting the roll of
members-elect toward a conservative coalition of Democrats and Unionists.  He intended to take
advantage of the stipulations in the recently passed 1863 law, which formally provided the Clerk
with the ability to certify the credentials of members-elect.  The intention of the law was to
enhance Republican strength in the succeeding Congress by providing the Clerk with discretion
to count loyalists from portions of the South under Union military control.  Etheridge, however,
saw the opportunity to apply a strict reading of the law, thereby requiring that very particular
“credentials” be presented in order to receive certification.  He then contacted the Democratic
House leader, Samuel S. Cox of Ohio, and shared his plan, describing the exact form of
credentials necessary while urging him to disseminate the information to Unionists as well as his
fellow Democrats (Belz 1970, p. 556-57).
Unfortunately for Etheridge, the details of his plan leaked out, and Republican leaders,
including President Abraham Lincoln, responded by organizing their partisans.  Credentials were
24
25 Interestingly, Allen had previously served as the House Clerk in the 35th Congress.
certified and all members-elect were urged to be present upon the opening of the 38th Congress. 
A list ditch effort was also made to convince Etheridge to drop his plan, but to no avail.  On
December 7, 1863, proceedings commenced and Etheridge called the roll.  When he had
finished, he had excluded 16 members from five states (Maryland, Missouri, West Virginia,
Kansas, and Oregon), while including 3 members from Louisiana (Congressional Globe, 38-1, p.
4).  After some heated discussion, Henry Dawes (R-Mass.) offered a resolution that the Missouri
members be added to the Clerk’s roll.  James C. Allen (D-Ill.) responded by moving to table
Dawes’s resolution and demanded the yeas and nays.25  
Here then was the showdown.  The question on Allen’s tabling motion was taken, and it
failed by a vote of 74-94 (Congressional Globe, 38-1, p. 5).  Table 4 provides a breakdown.  In
the end, the Republicans were unanimous in opposition to Allen’s tabling motion; however, the
conservative opposition was not cohesive, with five Democrats and six Unionists voting against
tabling.  Etheridge, however, had done his part:  had a unified conservative coalition of
Democrats and Unionists emerged, it would have upheld Allen’s tabling motion by a margin of
two votes, and thus stymied the Republicans’ ability to organize the chamber (Belz 1970, p.
562).  [Table 4 about here]
Victorious in the procedural standoff, the Republicans then moved to add the Maryland
members to the roll, followed in quick succession by the Missouri, West Virginia, Kansas, and
Oregon delegations.  Once accomplished, the Republicans proceeded to organize the chamber,
electing Schulyer Colfax (R-Ind.) as Speaker on the first ballot.  Etheridge was once again in the
running for the Clerk’s position, this time as the Conservative candidate rather than the
25
26 Etheridge was nominated for the Clerk’s position by Robert Mallory, a Unionist from
Kentucky.  In response, Owen Lovejoy (R-Ill.) stated that such a nomination, after Etheridge’s
failed procedural maneuver, “required a good deal of brass” (Congressional Globe, 38-1, p. 11). 
The New York Times took offense at claims that Etheridge’s behavior bordered on disloyal: “We
have not seen a particle of evidence that Mr. Etheridge, in declining to recognize certain
credentials, did not act in perfect good faith.  Possibly he was too punctilious, but he did what
any conscientious official might do.  The hot imputations upon his loyalty, discharged upon him
from certain quarters, were very senseless” (7/8/1863, p. 4).
administration choice, but he was defeated by Edward McPherson of Pennsylvania, by a 102-69
vote (Congressional Globe, 38-1, p. 11).26
After his defeat, Etheridge became an even more vociferous critic of the Republican
administration.  First, he led a group of conservatives in nominating George McClellan for the
presidency.  Then he ran unsuccessfully for election as a Conservative to the House from his
former 9th District in 1865 and to the Governorship of Tennessee in 1867.  He finally regained
political office with his election to the Tennessee General Assembly in 1869.  In time, much to
Etheridge’s chagrin, the Conservative movement in Tennessee was subsumed by the Democratic
Party.  As a result, he returned to the Republican fold, supporting Rutherford Hayes’s bid for the
Presidency in 1876, and remained a loyal party member until his death in 1902.
Edward McPherson, Radical Loyalist
In replacing Emerson Etheridge, Edward McPherson would hold the House Clerkship for
the next 12 years.  McPherson was the political protégé of Thaddeus Stevens (Pa.), Republican
Majority Leader in the House and Radical ideologue.  After studying law and working as a
newspaper editor, McPherson was elected to Congress, and served in the 36th and 37th Houses. 
He fell victim to the Republican backlash in the 1862 midterms and lost his bid for reelection to
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the 38th House.  Thus, he was in the right place at the right time when Etheridge staged his
failed conservative coup.  Stevens and his cadre sought a Clerk who would be loyal to their
Radical cause, and McPherson was deemed the logical choice (Trefousse 1997, pp. 174-75).
McPherson’s loyalty would be tested at the opening of the 39th House.  The path of
Southern Reconstruction was being determined in Congress, with Stevens pushing for a Radical
approach while President Andrew Johnson advocated a more conciliatory tack.  To secure his
hold on Reconstruction policy, Stevens demanded that the readmittance of Southern states (and
the guidelines thereof) be determined by a Joint Committee of Fifteen under his authority.  If this
were to happen, Stevens needed the “friendliest” House membership as possible.  To insure this,
he relied upon McPherson to exclude from the roll members-elect from former-Confederate
states, newly organized along the lines of Johnson’s Reconstruction plan.
On December 2, 1865, the 39th House convened.  McPherson played his part in Stevens’
drama by omitting members-elect from Tennessee, Virginia, and Louisiana from the roll.  A
heated debate followed, with Horace Maynard, member-elect from Tennessee, trying in vain to
gain floor recognition and Stevens and James Brooks (D-N.Y.) exchanging barbs.  Stevens
moved to proceed to the election of Speaker, which was eventually agreed to, and Schuyler
Colfax was reelected by a 139-36 vote over Brooks (Congressional Globe, 39-1, p. 5). 
McPherson was subsequently reelected, along with a slate of Republican officer nominees, by
resolution.  Stevens then called for a suspension of the rules in order to establish his Joint
Committee of Fifteen, which was successful.  Stevens and the Radicals had won the battle over
Reconstruction.
27
27 Tennessee was the one former-Confederate state excluded, as publication of the U.S. laws had
continued throughout the war (Smith 1976, pp. 236-37).
28 This was especially true in that the publication of laws was retroactive to the 37th Congress, to
cover the period when the Southern states had been part of the Confederacy.
29 The Radicals went a step further on March 29, 1867, at the start of the 40th Congress, when
authority for selecting newspapers to publish the nation’s laws for all states in the Union was
transferred from the Secretary of State to the House Clerk (Statutes at Large, 40-1, p. 8). 
Thus, McPherson was crucial in Stevens’ success.  He had remained loyal to the Radical
cause and did not wilt when pushed by Brooks and other Democrats.  As a result, Stevens tabbed
McPherson for a larger role in the Radical agenda.  On March 2, 1867, the second-to-last day of
the 39th Congress, the House passed a sundry appropriations bill (Statutes at Large, 39-2, pp.
466-67).  Tucked away in the bill was a provision transferring authority for the selection of
newspapers to publish the nation’s laws in the former-Confederate states27 from the Secretary of
State, who had possessed this authority since 1787, to the House Clerk.  This provision provided
McPherson with a prime patronage tool, as the compensation paid to selected newspapers was
substantial (Smith 1977, p. 238).28  Moreover, per Stevens’ wishes, McPherson could use this
patronage to select newspapers sympathetic to the Radicals’ point of view.29  In Stevens’ view,
the current Secretary of State, William Seward, was not reliable, as he would likely pursue a
more moderate course.  
McPherson moved quickly to select two “loyal” newspapers in each Southern state to
publish the U.S. laws (Smith 1977, p. 238-39; Abbott 1986, p. 92, 133-36; Abbott 2004, pp. 58-
59, 75-77, 128-32).  While happy with McPherson’s activities on his behalf, Stevens moved to
insure that a Radical Reconstruction would continue.  In February 1867, the Radicals pushed
through a law revising the 1863 legislation that formalized the Clerk’s control over the roll of
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members-elect.  The revision directed the Clerk to recognize only members-elect from states
represented in the preceding Congress, i.e., “loyal” states.  As Belz (1970, p. 567) notes, this
revision suggests that the Radicals “were unwilling to take any chances in organizing Congress. 
That lesson the Etheridge conspiracy had taught them.”
With the Democrats regaining control of the House in 1875, McPherson’s long run as
Clerk finally came to an end.  This would be a brief setback, however, as in many ways his
career was just beginning.  He served as the President of the Republican National Convention in
1876, the Director of the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing under President Hayes in 1877
and 1878, and the Secretary of the Republican Congressional Committee at various points in the
1880s.  He also would be elected House Clerk two more times, in the 47th (1881-83) and 51st
(1889-91) Congresses, when the Republicans returned to power.  Finally, he managed a
successful private career as well, writing several histories, publishing a Handbook of Politics
every two years from 1872 through 1894, and editing the New York Tribune Almanac from 1877
through 1895.
Electing the Clerk:  The Evolution of a Partisan Office
The responsibilities of the Clerk provide opportunities for the position to be powerful, or not,
depending on how House members respond to the office.  In the previous section we explored
how the four best-known Clerks played controversial roles in the partisan and regional clashes of
the day by allying themselves with the even more powerful, popularly elected politicians who
were their patrons.  In this section we pull the focus back to examine how House members more
generally considered the election of the Clerks who served them.
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Table 5 summarizes the electoral history of House Clerks from 1789 to 2003.  The
appendix reports more detailed information about each Clerk’s election up to 1873.  Up until the
reelection of Walter Franklin in 1837, the House Rules provided that all House officers,
including Clerks, would be elected by secret ballot.  In 1838, the House Rules were changed to
make elections of all House officers, including the Speaker and Printer as well as the Clerk, by
viva voce.  As Jenkins and Stewart (2003) show, the move to viva voce voting for House officers
was a strategy supported by rank-and-file Democrats to counter successful attempts by the Whig
minority to bid away pivotal Democrats in officer elections.  
[Table 5 about here]
The value of this move was demonstrated in the first two clerkship elections under this
regime, which elected and then re-elected Hugh Garland, which we discussed in the previous
section.  In both cases, Whigs were eager to form coalitions with conservative Democrats to
organize the chamber.  In the immediately prior past, they had been successful.  In the first
election of Garland (25th Congress, 3rd session) and in his subsequent re-election, it is likely
that he would not have been chosen under the previous secret ballot rules.  If that is true, then the
organizing chaos that surrounded the start of the 26th Congress could have turned out quite
differently than it did—and with it, the history of sectional strife that preceded the Civil War.
Even though the numerical results for the secret ballots for Clerk were reported to the
House before 1837, they were not always entered into the Journal, nor were they always
reported in newspapers.  Thus, we have no detailed knowledge of the election of the first Clerk,
John Beckley, nor do we have any detailed accounting of the election of John H. Oswald when
he filled the vacancy caused by the resignation of Jonathan Condy in the 6th Congress (1800), or
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the final election of Patrick Magruder as clerk at the start of the 13th Congress (1813).  The
initial election of Patrick Magruder at the start of the 10th Congress (1807) is similarly shrouded
in a clerical mystery, as only Magruder’s votes were announced on the fourth and final ballot of
a highly controversial election.  Furthermore, the requirement that election be by ballot was
violated ten times before 1837, when Clerks were elected via resolution; the viva voce rule was
violated three times for the remainder of the antebellum period when resolutions were used to
elect Clerks.  The viva voce requirement remained in the House Rules until the recodification in
the 106th Congress, even though officer elections (with the exception of the Speaker) had
generally proceeded via a resolution for nearly a century.  House Rule II no longer provides for
viva voce election of the House’s subordinate officers.
The evolution of voting for Clerk, from the First Congress through the end of the Civil
War suggests strong partisan and regional sentiments that gripped the chamber in this period,
particularly in the antebellum period.  Two related patterns stand out.  The first is the degree of
uncertainty surrounding Clerk elections, an uncertainty that abruptly ended with the start of the
Civil War.  The second is the fluctuation in party regularity governing Clerk elections, a pattern
that also hit a flat line with the Civil War.
Uncertainty surrounding the election of Clerks is best illustrated by the number of times
the House required multiple ballots to elect a Clerk—nine times before the Civil War.  Three of
these cases occurred when the Clerkship became vacant in the middle of a Congress, suggesting
that an ordered line of succession to the post was a long time in developing.  The multiple-ballot
battles for the clerkship appear mostly to have been internecine battles that were settled for good
once the Clerk was chosen.  In other words, winners of protracted contests generally
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consolidated their influence in the chamber sufficiently so that they rarely had problems winning
further reelection, even under partisan circumstances similar to those that greeted their initial
election.  For instance:
• John Beckley was elected Clerk of the first House on the second ballot, having tied on the
first ballot.  For the next two Congresses he was the elected unanimously by resolution,
followed by a handy defeat of a single opponent in the fourth Congress.  Even though he
was a notable Republican operative, he was defeated for reelection by the comfortably-
Federalist Fifth House by only a single vote.  He was easily elected Clerk again, and
appointed the first Librarian of Congress, when the Republicans regained controlled of
the House in 1801.
• Thomas Dougherty faced five opponents and endured two ballots when he was elected to
replace the discredited Patrick Magruder in the second session of the 13th Congress
(1815).  He was re-elected by a nearly unanimous vote in the 14th Congress, and was
subsequently unanimously re-elected by resolution in 1817, 1819, and 1821.
• When Dougherty died between the second and third sessions of the 17th Congress,
Matthew St. Clair Clarke was lost in a crowd of over a dozen candidates to succeed him. 
Clarke was finally elected after eleven ballots had been taken over two days.  He was
then re-elected in each of the next six Congresses—by unanimous resolution five times
and overwhelmingly the one instance when he faced an actual challenger.
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• Walter S. Franklin, in creating an exception to this pattern, actually defeated Matthew St.
Clair Clarke in a three-ballot contest to start the 23rd Congress.  He was then
unanimously re-elected by resolution at the start of the 24th Congress and
overwhelmingly vanquished a challenger at the start of the 25th.
Three multiple-ballot Clerkship winners were exceptions to this pattern of consolidation-
following-difficult-first-election:
• Patrick Magruder, the second Republican Clerk after Beckley’s long rein, was never
successfully challenged, yet never consolidated his hold on the seat like most other
incumbents who prevailed in protracted contests for the office.  Magruder vanquished a
total of eleven other candidates for the position at the start of the 10th Congress, faced a
strong challenge from four other candidates at the start of the next Congress, and then
was finally unanimously reelected at the start of the 12th.  Magruder had the bad fortune
of being Clerk when Washington was ransacked in the War of 1812, and was forced to
resign, leading to Dougherty’s eventual election  (Gordon 1975).  (See above.)
• Matthew St. Clair Clarke not only proved the rule (see above), but he was an exception,
as well.  Clarke’s long run at the Clerk’s desk, from 1822 to 1833, was ended in a
challenge at the start of the 23rd Congress that resulted in the election of Franklin. 
Clarke staged a comeback in the 27th Congress (see previous section) when the
33
Democrats exploited divisions among the majority Whigs to block their hold on the
subordinate House offices.
• Hugh Garland was another Clerk who had to fight through multiple ballots and
candidates to win the position (8 opponents, 3 ballots), only never to consolidate his hold. 
Garland’s troubles, however, were rooted in his handling of the organization of the 27th
Congress that we discussed in the previous section.  His support among Democrats
remained firm; he was only never able to win over any supporters among the Whigs.
The ebbing and flowing of Clerks’ firm hold on the office was related to the evolution of
the parties at the time.  In the antebellum period especially, the political parties were works in
progress, with two distinct periods of party development.  In the pre-Jackson era, the
Federalist/Republican split was evident, but both sides were sufficiently amorphous that
factionalism played a major role in internal partisan dynamics.  With the onset of the Jacksonian
era, parties became more internally cohesive, but sectional rivalries also festered, flaring up
every two years when the House reconvened and tried to organize.  Therefore, the parties were
sufficiently riven that even a party with a healthy majority could not reliably settle on a single
nominee for any office, from the Speakership on down.  The Civil War changed all that.  The
39th Congress, which met in 1865, re-elected Edward McPherson by a resolution that passed
along partisan lines.  Since that time, every Clerkship election has been resolved in one ballot;
all but four instances have been resolved through the passage of a resolution that named one
person for the position.
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30 There has never been a roll call vote for Clerk in which the same person was the top vote-
getter of both major parties.  Obviously, when a Clerk is unanimously elected via resolution, he
is the top vote-getter of both parties.  However, no unanimous resolution electing a House Clerk
has ever been subjected to a roll call vote.
Changes in how partisanship structured voting for Clerk are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2,
which graph out the degree of partisan unity in clerkship voting from the 1st to 99th Congresses. 
As a point of comparison, the partisan unity in voting for Speaker is also graphed for each
Congress.  In each case, partisan unity is measured by the percentage of House members who
voted for the Speaker or Clerk candidate who received the most votes within that party.30  These
figures show that disunity in Clerkship voting generally corresponded with disunity in
Speakership voting, though there were years when the parties were more unified in voting for
Speaker, and vice versa.
[Figures 1 and 2]
Tables 6 and 7 quantify further the sources of ideological and sectional divisions among
Democrats and Whigs/Republicans in voting for Clerk from 1838 to 1861 (i.e., the period of
contentious viva voce voting for Clerk).  In these tables, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if
the member voted for the Clerk candidate who was supported by the most members of the party,
0 otherwise.  The analysis is probit, with the independent variables being the first two
NOMINATE dimensions and a dummy variable for the deep south.  Only elections where a
party’s top Clerk candidate received less than 95% of the party’s vote are included in the table.
Among the Democrats note the following:  First, the NOMINATE coefficients are almost
never statistically significant at traditional levels, suggesting that clerkship contests rarely came
down to ideological fights within the party over party principles.  However, the deep south
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dummy variable is often significant, suggesting that sectionalism was a strong factor, at least on
the margins.  So, for instance, the Virginian Garland was supported more by southerners in his
first election in the 25th Congress than by northerners.  In the 31st Congress, in which the
Democrats were a minority, Democrats split among several Clerk candidates, most of whom
were regional favorites.  And in the 33rd Congress, Pennsylvanian John Forney’s support was
more concentrated among the north and the south—which is fitting for a man who became a
Radical Republican and was elected Clerk in the 36th Congress as a Republican.
A similar pattern emerges among Whigs and Republicans in their voting for Clerks. 
Ideological divisions among Whigs and Republicans were a bit more in evidence, with hard
liners more likely to support Fog Smith in the 27th Congress and oppose William Cullom’s
reelection (by resolution) in the 34th Congress (both of these unsuccessfully).  Ironically, it was
the most radical of Republicans who threw their support behind Emerson Etheridge in the 37th
Congress, a choice they lived to regret.  There were also regional divisions—southern Whigs
were more likely to support Matthew St. Clair Clarke in the special election in the 25th
Congress, Tennessean Thomas J. Campbell’s reelection in the 31st Congress, and Tennessean
James Walker’s (failed) election bid in the 32nd Congress.  The Campbell result is interesting, in
that the southern Whigs were especially opposed to his election in the 30th Congress.
A related topic to party unity is the ability of the coalition that elected the Speaker to
control the election of the Clerk.  Before the institution of viva voce voting for both Speakers and
Clerks in the 26th Congress, making judgements about officer control is prone to problems of
ecological inference and limitations of relying on press accounts.  Prior to the 26th Congress, the
only clear case of the Clerkship falling into the hands of the minority party was the first Clerk,
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Beckley, who was elected in a House that had a majority of pro-Administration members. 
However, as we discussed above, once Beckley’s proclivities became clear and the partisan
blocs solidified, he was denied the post, which stayed in the hands of Federalists until the
Republicans resumed control of the House in 1801.
The other candidate for minority control of the Clerkship is when Matthew St. Clair
Clarke held the post from the third session of the 17th Congress until the end of the 22nd
Congress (1822–1833).  Clarke, who holds the record for length of tenure among House Clerks,
is a political enigma.  Although Lanman (1887, p. 97) claims he “was quite famous as a
politician,” his life has eluded biographers.  He was first elected in 1822, following the death of
Thomas Dougherty.  He was then re-elected five consecutive times in Houses that were
controlled by Democrats or proto-Democrats.  Three times reelection was through unanimous
resolution; twice it was in a ballot in which his margin of victory exceeded the percentage of
House members who were Democrats.  However, he was barely defeated for reelection in the
23rd Congress (1833), losing by two votes to Walter S. Franklin.  In the first viva voce vote in
the 25th Congress, he also lost by two votes, this time to Hugh Garland.  In the final ballot, 90 of
Clarke’s 104 votes came from Whigs; all six of the Anti-Masonic votes went to Clarke.  Finally,
however, in the episode we previously examined, involving the Whigs’ inability to hold onto
control of the 27th House, Clarke regained the clerkship with the help of Democrats and
southern Whigs.
Matthew St. Clair Clarke’s political role as House Clerk is a puzzle that must therefore
await further research.
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After the advent of viva voce voting, it is easier to tell when the Clerk and the Speaker
were of different parties.  Here, the first clear case is the pair of organizing fights in the 26th and
27th Congresses that we explored in some detail above.  In the first instance the Democrat
Garland held the clerkship although the Speaker was a Whig.  (However, as also noted, the
speakership was about the only Whig victory of the 26th Congress.)  In the second instance
Democrats took advantage of rifts among the Whigs to deny them control of the clerkship.
The other case of split-party control of House officers was the 31st Congress (1849–51),
when the Whig Thomas Campbell was reelected Clerk.  In this instance, Democrat Howell Cobb
had been elected Speaker after a bruising 63-ballot affair (Stewart 1999, pp. 22–23).  What is
unique about this election is that the House eventually resorted to a plurality vote to select the
Speaker.  Therefore, the Speaker in no way could be understood as having a firm majority in the
chamber to rally.  Campbell ended up dying within three months of his election and was
replaced, this time, by a Democrat (Richard M. Young) after nine ballots.
IV.  Conclusion
This paper examines the role that the Clerk of the House of Representatives played in
partisan politics and chamber organization from the Nation’s Founding through Reconstruction. 
The House Clerk has been largely ignored by historians and political scientists, with the Speaker,
and to a lesser extent, the Printer, receiving most of scholars’ attention.  Nevertheless, during the
rough-and-tumble politics of the antebellum era, the Clerk was a key player in the partisan
political drama.  First, the Clerk controlled a number of formal positions and a significant purse
(the House’s contingent fund) for the House’s day-to-day expenses.  As a result, the Clerk was a
major patronage engine, doling out jobs and labor contracts to loyal partisans.  Second, the Clerk
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was the de facto chamber leader at the opening of a Congress, prior to the election of a new
Speaker.  In this capacity, he controlled the roll of members-elect, which provided him with
discretion in deciding whose credentials were valid and, thus, who could vote in the initial
organization of the House.  This was an important “ace in the hole” in an era of often evenly-
divided parties.  Once, in the 26th Congress (1839-41), it determined which party controlled the
House.
Besides examining the particular role that the Clerk played in institutional and
patronage-based politics, it is also important to understand how the Clerk fit into the larger
partisan context of the time.  To do so, we must think not only about the Clerk, but the Speaker
and Printer as well, as each House position served a complementary purpose in a larger partisan
endeavor.  As the proto-parties of the Federalist-Jeffersonian era began institutionalizing, leaders
worked to create solid lasting partisan loyalties in the broader electorate.  The set of House
officer positions would be one vehicle through which national party leaders sought to hasten
mass-party development, and in doing so, American political development more generally.  The
Speaker would be the policy engine, through his ability to appoint committees and control the
House agenda.  The Printer would be the transmission engine, disseminating the party agenda,
underwriting local newspapers throughout the country, and rewarding editors loyal to the larger
party cause.  The Clerk would be the organizing engine, building mass partisan identification
through patronage-based connections, such as jobs in the Clerk’s office and more general
contract-based employment, while overseeing the party membership in the chamber prior to the
selection of a new Speaker.
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As a result, while the Speaker, Printer, and Clerk can be studied individually in a static
sense, doing so runs the risk of obscuring the more dynamic, inter-related political drama.  That
is, the Speaker, Printer, and Clerk did not operate in a vacuum.  They performed as members of a
“team,” playing complementary roles toward the larger goal of building and maintaining a
national party following.
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Appendix
Recap of voting for Clerk
1st Congress
Election date:  April 1, 1789
John Beckley elected by ballot. Votes not
reported.  Two ballots necessary.
Sources:  House Journal and Annals of
Congress; Berkeley and Berkeley (1975).
2nd Congress
Election date:  October 24, 1791
John Beckley elected unanimously by ballot.
Source:  Annals of Congress
3rd Congress
Election date:  December 2, 1793
John Beckley unanimously elected by ballot.
Votes not reported.
Sources:  Carlisle Gazette (p. 3), New
Hampshire Gazette (p. 1); Philadelphia
Aurora Daily Advertiser (p. 3).
4th Congress
Election date:  December 7, 1795
John Beckley 48
Mr. Baynton 30
Sources:  Connecticut Gazette (12/17/1795,
p. 2); Boston Independent Chronicle
(12/17/1795, p. 2); Connecticut Courant
(12/7/1795, p. 3); Otsego Herald
(12/24/1795, p. 2)   [note that Baynton’s
vote is listed as 31]; Philadelphia Gazette of
the United States (12/8/1795, p. 2)  [note
that Baynton’s vote is listed as 31];
Philadelphia Aurora and General Advertiser
(12/8/1795, p. 3).
5th Congress
Election date:  May 15, 1797
Jonathan Williams Condy 41
John Beckley 40
Total 81
Needed to elect 41
Source:  Annals of Congress
6th Congress
Election date:  December 2, 1797
Jonathan W. Condy 47
John Beckley 39
Total 86
Needed to elect 44
Note:  Condy resigned on December 9,
1800, due to ill health.
Election date:  December 9, 1800
John Holt Oswald  elected by ballot. 
John Holt Osward 51
John Beckley 42
Sources:  House Journal and Annals of
Congress; Berkeley and Berkeley (1973, p.
209); Philadelphia Aurora (12/13/1800;
12/15/1800).
7th Congress
Election date:  December 7, 1801
John Beckley 57
John Holt Oswald 29
Total 86
Needed to elect 44
Sources: Gazette of the United States
(12/12/01, p. 2); New York Gazette and
General Advertiser (12/14/01, p. 3); New
York Evening Post (12/12/01, p. 3);
Philadelphia Aurora (12/11/01, p. 2)
Washington Federalist (12/8/01, p. 2).
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8th Congress
Election date:  October 17, 1803
John Beckley 93
E.B. Caldwell 4
_____ 1
_____ 1
Total 99
Needed to elect 50
Sources: Albany Centinel (10/28/03, p. 2);
Kline’s Carlisle Weekly Gazette
(10/26/1803, p. 10; New York Evening Post
(10/21/1803, p. 2); Philadelphia Aurora
(10/20/1803, p. 2)
9th Congress
Election date:  December 2, 1805
John Beckley 85
William Lambert 18
Total 103
Needed to elect 52
Sources:  Massachusetts Spy (12/18/1805, p.
2); New York Evening Post (12/5/1805, p.
2); Philadelphia Aurora (12/5/1805, p.
3);Washington National Intelligencer
(12/3/1805, p. 2).
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10th Congress
Election date:  October 26, 1807
Ballot
1* 2 3** 4***
Nicholas B. Vanzandt 37 52 16
Patrick Magruder 26 28 52 72
James Elliot 16 15 27
Josias W. King 16 10 9
[Unknown candidate 1] 14
[Unknown candidate 2] 14
[Unknown candidate 3] 5
[Unknown candidate 4] 1
William Lambert 7 8
Theodosius Hansford 1 5
C. Minifie 1
Total 129 114 114 118
Needed to elect 65 59 59 60
*Note from Annals of Congress:  “It appearing to the tellers, on examining the votes, that one of
the members had, by mistake, voted twice, this balloting, after a few desultory remarks, was set
aside, and a fresh one taken...”
**Before this ballot, Randolph took the floor and accused Vanzandt of leaking comments he had
made in an executive session of the House.  Vanzandt denied this.  The House refused to delay
balloting for clerk.
***The votes of the other candidates not announced
Sources:  House Journal; Washington National Intelligencer (10/27/1807, p. 2); Washington
Federalist (10/28/07, p. 2)
11th Congress
Election date:  May 22, 1809
Patrick Magruder 63
Daniel Brent 38
Nicholas B. Van Zandt 14
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William Lambert 7
Mr. Scott 1
Total 123
Needed to elect 62
Source:  Annals of Congress
12th Congress
Election date:  November 14, 1811
Patrick Magruder 97
William Lambert 16
Total 113
Needed to elect 57
Source:  Washington National Intelligencer
(11/6/1811, p. 1)
13th Congress
Election date:  May 24, 1813
Patrick Magruder 111
Remaining vote unknown
Source:  Annals of Congress
Note:  Magruder fell under controversy
concerning his actions during the evacuation
from Washington.  Facing a resolution
removing him office, Magruder resigned on
January 28, 1815.
Election date:  January 31, 1815
Ballot
1 2
Thomas Dougherty 80 83
Thomas L. McKeneey 35 73
O.B. Brown 13
Samuel Burch 19
N.B. Van Zandt 4
Scattering 6 4
Total 157 160
Needed to elect 79 81
Note:  It appears that Dougherty received a
majority on the first ballot, but that fact was
not noted in the Annals.
14th Congress
Election date:  December 4, 1815
Thomas Dougherty 114
Scattering 8
Total 122
Needed to elect 62
Source:  Annals of Congress.
15th Congress
Election date:  December 1, 1817
Thomas Dougherty 144
Total 144
Needed to elect 78
Source:  Annals of Congress.
16th Congress
Election date:  December 6, 1819
Thomas Dougherty elected unanimous by
resolution.
Source:  Annals of Congress.
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17th Congress
Election date:  December 3, 1821
Thomas Dougherty elected unanimous by resolution.
Source:  Annals of Congress.
Note:  Dougherty died during the recess between the 2nd and 3rd sessions.
Election date:  December 3, 1822
December 2 December 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
William Milnor 14 12 9 7 — — 11 9 — — —
Samuel Burch 10 6 — — — — — — — — —
Levi H. Clarke 19 22 24 26 21 12 19 5 — — —
B.S. Chambers 17 20 20 25 28 29 26 25 23 7 —
S.D. Franks 15 13 13 8 10 9 16 20 15 2 —
Tobias Watkins 12 10 12 6 — — 3 — — — —
Robert Temple 13 15 23 28 46 54 46 47 50 55 48
Edward W. DuVal 5 — — — — — — — — — —
S.A. Foot 9 9 8 6 — — 13 16 16 13 —
James H. Pleasants 13 13 15 17 8 17 12 3 — — —
Mr. Briggs 5 — — — — — — — — — —
J.S. Williams 4 — — — — — — — — — —
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 9 12 14 17 21 24 5* 29 15 71 98
Mr. Goldsborough — 4 — 7 — — — — — — —
Scattering 9 4 11 0 9 3 — — — — 4
Total 154 140 149 147 143 148 151 144 119 148 150
Needed to elect 78 71 75 74 72 75 76 73 60 75 76
*“In this report of the Tellers, there was an error, as afterwards appeared.  The votes placed to
the credit of Levi H. Clarke were mostly intended for Mr. M. St. C. Clarke.” (Annals of
Congress)
Source:  Annals of Congress
18th Congress
Election date:
December 1, 1823
Matthew St. Clair Clarke appointed by
unanimous resolution.
Source:  Annals of Congress.
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19th Congress
Election date:  December 5, 1825
Matthew St. Clair Clarke appointed by
motion of Mr. Lathrop.
Source:  Annals of Congress.
20th Congress
Election date:  December 3, 1827
Matthew St. Clair Clarke appointed by
unanimous resolution.
Source:  Annals of Congress.
21st Congress
Election date:  December 7, 1829
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 135
Virgil Maxcy 54
Scattering 3
Total 192
Needed to elect 97
Source:  Charleston Courier (12/7/1829, p.,
2); Daily National Intelligencer (12/8/1829,
p. 3); Richmond Enquirer (12/17/1829, p. 1)
22nd Congress
Election date:  December 5, 1831
Matthew St. Clair Clarke appointed by
unanimous resolution.
Source:  Annals of Congress.
23rd Congress
Election date:  December 2, 1833
Ballot
1 2 3
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 113 112 110
Walter S. Franklin 107 114 117
Eleezer Early 2 — —
Walter P. Clarke 1 — —
Thomas C. Love 5 — —
Blank 3 2 —
Total 231 228 229
Needed to elect 116 115 115
Source:  Annals of Congress.
24th Congress
Election date:  December 7, 1835
Walter S. Franklin appointed by resolution.
Source:  Annals of Congress.
25th Congress
Election date:  September 9, 1837
Walter S. Franklin 146
Samuel Shoch 48
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 7
Blank 8
Total 209
Needed to elect 105
Source:  Annals of Congress.
Note:  Franklin died on September 20, 1838,
in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
All remaining votes are viva voce, unless
otherwise noted.
Election date:  December 3, 1838
Ballot
1 2 3
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 55 88 104
Hugh A. Garland 48 59 106
Edward Livingston 31 26
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Samuel Shoch 21 13 —
Arnold Naudain 20 4 —
Henry Buehler 16 13 —
James H. Birch 9 — —
John Bigler 8 6 —
Reuben M. Whitney 2 — —
Total 190 209 210
Needed to elect 96 105 106
Source:  House Journal
26th Congress
Election date:  December 21, 1839
Hugh A. Garland 117
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 105
Richard C. Mason 8
Total 230
Needed to elect 116
Source:  House Journal
27th Congress
Election date:  May 31, 1841
Ballot
1 2 3 4
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 38 51 91 128
Francis O.J. Smith 90 90 80 67
Richard C. Mason 13 17 32 19
Hugh A. Garland 81 61 15 6
Total 212 219 218 220
Needed to elect 107 110 110 111
Source:  House Journal
28th Congress
Election date:  December 6, 1843
Caleb J. McNulty 124
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 66
Total 190
Needed to elect 96
Note:  McNulty was dismissed as Clerk by
resolution on January 18, 1845.
Election date:  January 18, 1845
Benjamin French was unanimously elected
by resolution.
Source:  House Journal.
29th Congress
Election date:  December 2, 1845
Benjamin French was unanimously elected
by resolution.
Source:  House Journal.
30th Congress
Election date:  December 7, 1847
Thomas J. Campbell 113
Benjamin B. French 109
George Kent 1
Nathan Sergeant 1
Samuel L. Governeur 1
Source:  House Journal
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31st Congress
Election date:  January 11, 1850
Date: January 3 January 7 January 8 January 9 January 10 January 11
Ballot: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
John W. Forney 98 103 107 107 106 106 107 106 105 105 106 105 105 103 102 96 93 93 97 96
Thomas J. Campbell 77 81 94 95 102 72 13 13 13 13 — — — — — 32 28 96 103 112
Calvin W. Pilleo 8 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 — — —
John H.C. Mudd 7 5 2 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Samuel L. Gouveneur 5 1 — — 1 — 1 1 1 1 — — — — — — 1 1 — —
Philander B. Prindle 4 4 1 — 2 6 1 1 — — — — — 1 — 63 63 2 2 1
Nathan Sargent 3 3 3 3 2 2 — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
De Witt C. Clarke 2 2 2 1 1 — — 1 1 1 3 5 — — — — — — — —
Samuel P. Benson 2 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Solomon Foot 2 3 3 5 25 92 94 93 93 104 103 103 98 103 2 2 3 3 2
Benjamin B. French — 1 2 2 2 4 2 1 1 — 1 3 4 4 3 11 18 18 13 9
Matthew St. Clair Clarke — — — — — — — — — — — — 5 7 3 — — — — —
George P. Fisher — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 7 9 — — —
John Smith — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1 — — — —
Total 208 209 220 219 220 219 220 221 219 217 218 220 221 219 215 216 217 213 218 220
Needed to elect 105 105 111 110 111 110 111 111 110 109 110 111 111 110 108 109 109 107 110 111
 
Source:  House Journal
Note:  Campbell died on April 13, 1850.
48
Election date:  April 17, 1850
April 16 April 17
Ballot: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Philander B. Prindle 48 47 44 45 32 30 25 16 5
Richard M. Young 22 35 44 54 63 72 73 70 96
Hiram Walbridge 17 19 18 15 11 5 4 2 —
John W. Forney 17 13 11 10 6 5 3 3 —
James C. Walker 17 19 29 33 51 47 49 55 82
Albert Smith 15 15 12 9 8 3 — — —
Adam J. Glossbrenner 12 12 9 5 3 4 3 2 —
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 12 11 10 8 5 6 8 13 1
James H. Forsyth 10 — — — — — — — —
James W. Moorhead 10 10 8 3 — — — — —
J.H.C. Mudd 6 4 2 — — — — — —
Edmund Burke 1 — — — — — — — —
Ethan A. Stansbury — — — — — 7 8 6 —
Jesse E. Dow — — — — — 1 — — —
Albert Smith — — — — — — 1 1 —
Charles B. Flood — — — — — — — 4 —
Ethan A. Stansbury — — — — — — — — 4
Total 187 185 187 182 179 180 174 172 188
Needed for election 94 93 94 92 90 91 88 87 95
Source:  House Journal
32nd Congress
Election date:  December 1, 1851
John W. Forney 127
James C. Walker 72
E. A. Stansbury 3
George Darsie 2
Richard M. Young 2
Total 206
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Needed to elect 104
Source:  House Journal
33rd Congress
Election date:  December 5, 1853
John W. Forney 122
Richard M. Young 27
Philander B. Prindle 18
Ebenezer Hutchinson 12
E. P. Smith 10
James C. Walker 6
W. H. Bogart 2
G.W. Mumford 1
Charles Brown 1
John M. Barclay 1
Total 200
Needed to elect 101
Source:  House Journal
34th Congress
Election date:  February 4, 1856
William Cullom was elected by resolution,
126–89.
Source:  House Journal
35th Congress
Election date:  December 7, 1857
James C. Allen 128
B. Gratz Brown 84
William Cullom 4
John M. Sullivan 2
Total 218
Needed to elect 110
Source:  House Journal
36th Congress
Election date:  February 3, 1860
John W. Forney 111
James C. Allen 77
Nathaniel G. Taylor 23
D. L. Dalton 8
Zadock W. McKnew 1
Source:  House Journal
37th Congress
Election date:  July 4, 1861
Emerson Etheridge 92
John W. Forney 41
John E. Dietrich 21
Thomas B. Florence 2
Total 156
Needed to elect 79
Source: House Journal
38th Congress
Election date:  December 8, 1863
Edward McPherson 101
Emerson Etheridge 69
Total 170
Needed to elect 86
Source:  House Journal
39th Congress
Election date:  December 4, 1865
Edward McPherson elected by resolution
138–35.
Source:  House Journal
40th Congress
Election date:  March 4, 1867
Edward McPherson elected by resolution.
Source:  House Journal
41st Congress
Election date:  March 5, 1869
For Edward McPherson 128
For Charles W. Carrigan 55
Total 183
Needed to elect 92
Source:  House Journal
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42nd Congress
Election date:  March 4, 1871
Edward McPherson elected by resolution.
Source:  House Journal
43rd Congress
Election date:  December 1, 1873
Edward McPherson elected by resolution.
Source:  House Journal
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Figure 1.  Democratic party cohesion in Speakership and Clerkship votes, 25th–99th Congress.
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Figure 2.  Whig/Republican party cohesion in Speakership and Clerkship votes, 25th–99th
Congress.
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Table 1.  Resources under the Clerk’s Control, 1823-1870
Year
Congress -
Session
Full Time
Employees
Part Time
Employees
Contingent Fund
Appropriations
1823 18-1 7 9 25,000
1824 18-2 7 12 60,000
1825 19-1 7 11 50,000
1826 19-2 8 13 72,500
1827 20-1 8 13 92,235
1828 20-2 8 13 80,000
1829 21-1 8 15 85,000
1830 21-2 8 19 85,000
1831 22-1 8 19 80,000
1832 22-2 8 22 155,000
1833 23-1 8 22 100,000
1834 23-2 8 32 213,089
1835 24-1 8 36 200,000
1836 24-2 *** *** 200,000
1837 25-2 *** *** 200,000
1838 25-3 *** *** 225,000
1839 26-1 *** *** 200,000
1840 26-2 *** *** 200,000
1841 27-2 *** *** 160,836
1842 27-3 12 6 175,000
1843 28-1 9 5 125,000
1844 28-2 9 5 175,000
1845 29-1 9 5 75,000
1846 29-2 10 5 170,000
1847 30-1 10 5 216,703
1848 30-2 10 5 200,000
1849 31-1 *** *** 167,757
1850 31-2 *** *** 312,000
1851 32-1 11 5 197,749
1852 32-2 13 4 209,971
1853 33-1 14 3 456,610
1854 33-2 13 5 288,344
1855 34-1 16 3 323,796
1856 34-3 25 7 593,658
1857 35-1 20 0 548,495
1858 35-2 20 0 581,305
1859 36-1 32 11 434,065
1860 36-2 24 0 557,125
1861 37-1 *** *** 365,200
1862 37-2 *** *** 432,000
1863 38-1 *** *** 189,200
1864 38-2 47 2 290,033
1865 39-1 50 2 243,592
1866 39-2 49 6 291,250
1867 40-2 52 9 308,622
1868 40-3 51 0 495,865
1869 41-2 44 8 534,435
1870 41-3 51 0 301,783
Source: Various House Documents, House Miscellaneous Documents, and Statutes at Large
volumes. *** indicates that employee rosters were not made available.
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Table 2.  Key roll calls on the admission of the five New Jersey Whigs.
a.  The clerk should call the names of the five new jersey whigs
Yea Nay Total
Anti Masons 6 0 6
Whigs 105 1 106
Democrats 3 117 120
Conservatives 1 0 1
Total 115 118 223
Source: Congressional Globe, 26-1, p. 40.  December 11, 1839.
Defections: John Campbell (D-S.C.), Charles Shepard (D-N.C.), Cave Johnson (D-Tenn.),
Charles Johnston (W-N.Y.)
b.  The five New Jersey Whigs are entitled to their seats.
Yea Nay Total
Anti Masons 6 0 6
Whigs 106 0 106
Democrats 3 117 120
Conservatives 2 0 2
Total 117 117 234
Source: Congressional Globe, 26-1, p. 48.  December 13, 1839.
Defections:  John Campbell (D-S.C.), R. Barnwell Rhett (D-S.C.), Charles Shepard (D-N.C.)
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c.  The Speaker should swear in the five New Jersey Whigs.
Yea Nay Total
Anti Masons 6 0 6
Whigs 103 0 103
Democrats 1 116 117
Conservatives 2 0 2
Total 112 116 228
Source: Congressional Globe, 26-1, p. 69.  December 20, 1839.
Defection:  John Campbell (D-S.C.)
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Table 3.  Partisan breakdown of vote for speaker and clerk, 27th Congress.
a.  Speaker
Whig Democrat Independent Total
George N. Briggs (W-Mass.) 1 0 0 1
Nathan Clifford (D-Me.) 0 1 0 1
William Cost Johnson (W-Md.) 1 0 0 1
John W. Jones (D-Va.) 0 83 1 84
Joseph Lawrence (W-Pa.) 5 0 0 5
John White (W-Ky.) 121 0 0 121
Henry A. Wise (W-Va.) 6 2 0 8
Total 134 86 1 221
b.  Clerk–1st ballot
Whig Democrat Independent Total
Francis O.J. Smith 89 0 0 89
Hugh A. Garland 0 81 0 81
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 38 0 0 38
Richard C. Mason 8 4 1 13
Total 135 85 1 221
c.  Clerk–2nd ballot
Whig Democrat Independent Total
Francis O.J. Smith 89 0 0 89
Hugh A. Garland 1 60 0 61
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 37 14 0 51
Richard C. Mason 5 11 1 17
Total 132 85 1 218
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d.  Clerk–3rd ballot
Whig Democrat Independent Total
Francis O.J. Smith 79 0 0 79
Hugh A. Garland 0 15 0 15
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 47 43 1 91
Richard C. Mason 5 27 0 32
Total 131 85 1 217
d.  Clerk–4th ballot
Whig Democrat Independent Total
Francis O.J. Smith 66 0 0 66
Hugh A. Garland 0 6 0 6
Matthew St. Clair Clarke 64 63 1 128
Richard C. Mason 4 15 0 19
Total 134 84 1 219
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Table 4.  Roll call to table Dawes’s resolution
Yeas Nays Total
Republicans 0 83 83
Democrats 67 5 72
Unionists 7 6 13
Total 74 94 168
Source: Congressional Globe, 38-1, p. 5.
Note: Party codes taken from Martis (1989).  The following adjustments were made: Unionists
are a combined category (Conditional and Unconditional Unionists); and one individual’s party
code was switched (Rufus Spalding of Ohio, whom Martis classifies as a Republican while other
sources code him as a Democrat).
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Table 5. Elections of the House Clerk, 1789–2003
Effective number of
candidates Winning clerk Majority party
Year Cong. sess. Ballots First ballot Last ballot
Winning
pct. Name Party Namec Pct.
1789 1 1 ? ? ? John Beckley R Pro.-A 57
1791 2 1 1 1a 100 John Beckley R Pro.-A 57
1793 3 1 1 1a 100 John Beckley R Anti-A 51
1795 4 1 1 1.9 61.5 John Beckley R R 56
1797 5 1 1 2 50.6 Jonathan W. Condy F F 54
1799 6 1 1 1.98 54.7 Jonathan W. Condy F F 57
1800 6 2 1 1.98 54.8 John H. Oswald F " "
1801 7 1 1 1.81 66.3 John Beckley R R 64
1803 8 1 1 1.13 88.2 John Beckley R R 73
1805 9 1 1 1.41 82.5 John Beckley R R 80
1807 10 1 4 6.06 ? 61 Patrick Magruder R R 82
1809 11 1 1 2.67 51.2 Patrick Magruder R R 65
1811 12 1 1 1.32 85.8 Patrick Magruder R R 75
1813 13 1 1 ? ? Patrick Magruder R R 63
1815 13 3 2 3 2.09 51.9 Thomas Dougherty R " "
1815 14 1 1 1.14 93.4 Thomas Dougherty R R 65
1817 15 1 1 1a 100 Thomas Dougherty R R 79
1819 16 1 1 1a 100 Thomas Dougherty R R 86
1821 17 1 1 1a 100 Thomas Dougherty R R 62
1822 17 3 11 15.72 1.89 65.3 Matthew St. Clair Clarke ? " "
1823 18 1 1 1a 100 Matthew St. Clair Clarke A-C R A-C R 41
1825 19 1 1 1a 100 Matthew St. Clair Clarke A A 51
1827 20 1 1 1a 100 Matthew St. Clair Clarke J J 53
1829 21 1 1 1.74 70.3 Matthew St. Clair Clarke J J 64
1831 22 1 1 1a 100 Matthew St. Clair Clarke J J 59
1833 23 1 3 2.14 2 51.5 Walter S. Franklin J J 60
1835 24 1 1 1a 100 Walter S. Franklin J J 59
1837 25 1 1 1.71 72.6 Walter S. Franklin D D 53
1838 25 2 3 5.86 2 50.5 Hugh A. Garland D " "
1839 26 1 1 2.13 50.9 Hugh A. Garland D D 52
1841 27 1 4 3.03 2.28 58.2 Matthew St. Clair Clarke W W 59
1843 28 1 1 1.83 65.3 Caleb J. McNulty D D 66
1845 28 2 1 1a 100 Benjamin French D " "
1845 29 1 1 1a 100 Benjamin French D D 62
1847 30 1 1 2.05 50.2 Thomas J. Campbell W W 50
1850 31 1 20 2.76 2.22 50.9 Thomas J. Campbell W D 49
1850 31 1 9 8.39 2.21 51.1 Richard M. Young D " "
1851 32 1 1 1.99 61.7 John W. Forney D D 55
1853 33 1 1 2.47 61 John W. Forney D D 67
1855 34 1 1 1a 100 William Cullom W Opp 43
1857 35 1 1 3.03 58.7 James C. Allen D D 56
1859 36 1 1 2.57 50.5 John W. Forney R R 49
1861 37 1 1 2.3 59 Emerson Etheridge ?b R 59
1863 38 1 1 1.93 59.4 Edward McPherson R R 46
1865 39 1 1 1a 58.6 Edward McPherson R R 71
1867 40 1 1 1a 100 Edward McPherson R R 77
1869 41 1 1 1.73 70 Edward McPherson R R 70
1871 42 1 1 1a 100 Edward McPherson R R 56
1873 43 1 1 1a 100 Edward McPherson R R 68
1875 44 1 1 1a 100 George M. Adams
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Effective number of
candidates Winning clerk Majority party
Year Cong. sess. Ballots First ballot Last ballot
Winning
pct. Name Party Namec Pct.
1877 45 1 1 1a 100 George M. Adams
1879 46 1 1 1a 100 George M. Adams
1881 47 1 1 2.12 51.7 Edward McPherson
1883 48 1 1 1a 100 John B. Clark, Jr.
1885 49 1 1 1a 100 John B. Clark, Jr.
1887 50 1 1 1a 100 John B. Clark, Jr.
1889 51 1 1 1a 100 Edward McPherson
1891 52 1 1 1a 100 James Kerr
1893 53 1 1 1a 100 James Kerr
1895 54 1 1 1a 100 Alexander McDowell
1897 55 1 1 1a 100 Alexander McDowell
1899 56 1 1 1a 100 Alexander McDowell
1901 57 1 1 1a 100 Alexander McDowell
1903 58 1 1 1a 100 Alexander McDowell
1905 59 1 1 1a 100 Alexander McDowell
1907 60 1 1 1.96 56.7 Alexander McDowell
1909 61 1 1 1a 100 Alexander McDowell
1911 62 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1913 63 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1915 64 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1917 65 1 1 2 50.5 South Trimble D
1919 66 1 1 1a 100 William Tyler Page R
1921 67 1 1 1a 100 William Tyler Page R
1923 68 1 1 1a 100 William Tyler Page R
1925 69 1 1 1a 100 William Tyler Page R
1927 70 1 1 1a 100 William Tyler Page R
1929 71 1 1 1a 100 William Tyler Page R
1931 72 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1933 73 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1935 74 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1937 75 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1939 76 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1941 77 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1943 78 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1945 79 1 1 1a 100 South Trimble D
1947 80 1 1 1a 100 John Andrews R
1949 81 1 1 1a 100 Ralph R. Roberts D
1951 82 1 1 1a 100 Ralph R. Roberts D
1953 83 1 1 1a 100 Lyle O. Snader
1955 84 1 1 1a 100 Ralph R. Roberts D
1957 85 1 1 1a 100 Ralph R. Roberts D
1959 86 1 1 1a 100 Ralph R. Roberts D
1961 87 1 1 1a 100 Ralph R. Roberts D
1963 88 1 1 1a 100 Ralph R. Roberts D
1965 89 1 1 1a 100 Ralph R. Roberts D
1967 90 1 1 1a 100 W. Pat Jennings D
1969 91 1 1 1a 100 W. Pat Jennings D
1971 92 1 1 1a 100 W. Pat Jennings D
1973 93 1 1 1a 100 W. Pat Jennings D
1975 94 1 1 1a 100 Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr. D
1977 95 1 1 1a 100 Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr. D
1979 96 1 1 1a 100 Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr. D
1981 97 1 1 1a 100 Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr. D
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Effective number of
candidates Winning clerk Majority party
Year Cong. sess. Ballots First ballot Last ballot
Winning
pct. Name Party Namec Pct.
1983 98 1 1 1a 100 Benjamin J. Guthrie D
1985 99 1 1 1a 100 Benjamin J. Guthrie D
1987 100 1 1 1a 100 Donnald K. Anderson D
1989 101 1 1 1a 100 Donnald K. Anderson D
1991 102 1 1 1a 100 Donnald K. Anderson D
1993 103 1 1 1a 100 Donnald K. Anderson D
1995 104 1 1 1a 100 Robin H. Carle R
1997 105 1 1 1a 100 Jeff Trandahl R
1999 106 1 1 1a 100 Jeff Trandahl R
2001 107 1 1 1a 100 Jeff Trandahl R
2003 108 1 1 1a 100 Jeff Trandahl R
aElected via resolution; only candidate considered.  Non-unanimous votes indicate vote division.  Unanimous votes indicate either an explicitly
unanimous vote,  passage without mention of dissent, or passage via voice vote.
bEtheridge’s partisanship is suspect.  He is listed in various sources as “American,” “Whig,” “Conservative,” and “Unionist.”  At the time of his
election as Clerk, “Unionist” is probably the best characterization.
cParty names follow the labels assigned by Martis (1989).  They are abbreviated as follows:
Pro-A:  Pro-Administration
Anti-A:  Anti-Administration
R:  Republican
F:  Federalist
A-C R:  Adams-Clay Republican
J:  Jackson
D:  Democrat
W:  Whig
Opp:  Opposition
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Table 6.  Democratic support for top Democratic clerk candidate on first ballot, probit analysis.
25S 26 27 28 29 30 31 31S 32 33 34 35 36 37
NOMINATE
Dim. 1
0.42
(0.99)
— — — — — -5.41
(3.16)
-3.67
(2.00)
— -1.12
(1.08)
— — 4.76
(3.68)
-4.01
(1.61)
NOMINATE
Dim. 2
0.95
(0.47)
2.08
(1.05)
2.10
(0.72)
0.86
(0.42)
3.08
(1.00)
0.22
(0.54)
South 1.78
(0.59)
-4.24
(1.93)
0.02
(0.49)
-1.68
(0.54)
-6.02
(1.91)
—
Intercept -0.16
(0.45)
2.65
(0.81)
-2.46
(0.77)
1.82
(0.30)
10.40
—
-0.87
(0.50)
N 105 102 90 133 75 35
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.28 0.3 0.24 0.57 0.15
LLF -45.7 -16.5 -30.6 -37.4 -11.8 -20.4
Party unity 41.9 100 95.3 98.4 99.1 99.1 94.1 23.3 97.4 88.7 95.9 100 88 55.6
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Table 7.  Whig/Republican support for top Whig/Republican clerk candidate on first ballot, probit analysis.
25S 26 27 28 29 30 31 31S 32 33 34 35 36 37
NOMINATE
Dim. 1
4.49
(6.15)
0.35
(1.48)
2.88
(1.23)
— — — 0.83
(1.24)
-2.01
(1.26)
0.67
(1.68)
1.10
(1.27)
5.18
(1.37)
— — 2.78
(1.06)
NOMINATE
Dim. 2
0.61
(1.18)
-0.94
(0.65)
-0.14
(0.32)
0.66
(0.42)
0.39
(0.45)
0.70
(0.59)
1.19
(0.77)
1.57
(0.49)
0.22
(0.38)
South 4.46
—
-0.26
(0.52)
-0.87
(0.39)
5.36
—
0.05
(0.53)
4.72
—
0.56
(0.79)
— —
Intercept -3.80
(2.32)
2.04
(0.64)
-0.16
(0.39)
0.42
(0.50)
-0.25
(0.51)
1.38
(0.59)
-1.94
(0.54)
-0.30
(0.41)
-0.37
(0.40)
N 93 105 135 94 86 73 60 94 97
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.19 0.22 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.29 0.07
LLF -5.02 -18.9 -67.4 -43.1 -39.3 -14.1 -15.6 -25.6 -53.3
Party unity 53.8 94.3 65.9 98.4 — 98.2 79.8 52.3 94.5 30 87.2 95.3 99 72.8
